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SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT
There is no inconsistency between decisions of this court
which have applied the doctrine of equitable conversion and the
result urged by petitioners in this case.

The fact that this

court has applied the doctrine of equitable conversion in earlier
cases does not mandate a holding that equitable conversion is a
rule of universal application whenever the property interests of
a seller and buyer of real property on contract are considered.
Nor is it illogical to conclude that the contract seller and the
contract buyer might both have an ownership interest in the real
property sold on contract/ either of which interest might become
subject to the lien of a judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-22-1.

The courts of other states have held that two lienable

interests exist when real property has been sold on contract
prior to the entry or docketing of a judgment when the contract
is still executory in part.
If the seller's interest in the real property sold on
contract is measured by the amount still owing on the contract at
the time the buyer acquires actual notice of a docketed judgment
against the seller/ there is no undue burden to the buyer in
requiring him from that time forward to honor the lien and make
payments as they become due to the judgment creditor.

In fact/

in this case the Clements assert that the lien of their judgment
against the Barkers bound the Lockhart Road property only in the
amount that was still unpaid on the uniform real estate contract
between the judgment debtors/ the Barkers/ and the purchaser/

2

Diane Hodge, at the time the Cannefaxes agent acquired notice of
the judgment.
The Cannefaxes argument that the title company that
discovered the existence of the judgment was not their agent (or
that evidence of agency is lacking) was not raised in the trial
court and should not be considered for the first time now.
Nevertheless, the stipulated facts implicitly establish that the
title company was the Cannefaxes1 agent.

If this court does hold

that the issu§ of the title company's agency is determinative and
unresolved by the stipulated facts, and that the Cannefaxes were
not required to first raise the issue in opposition to the
Clements summary judgment motion, then rather than affirm the
ruling and order of the Court of.Appeals, the appropriate action
would be to remand to the trial court for findings as to whether
or not Surety Title was acting as the Cannefaxes1 agent when it
conducted the title report which disclosed the judgment.
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REPLY ARGUMENT
A.
WHEN PROPERTY IS SOLD ON CONTRACT, WHICH CONTRACT
IS EXECUTORY, THERE IS NO INCONSISTANCY WITH
PRIOR UTAH LAW IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF
TWO SEPARATE PROPERTY INTERESTS, EITHER
OF WHICH MIGHT BECOME SUBJECT TO A
JUDGMENT LIEN
In Point I of Respondents1 Brief, the Cannefaxes argue tnat
in view of this court f s consistent application to date of the
doctrine of equitable conversion it would be inconsistent to not
apply the doctrine in this case.

Of course, in each of the

previous Utah cases relied upon by respondents, Allred v. Allred,
15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 (1964), In re Estate of Willson, 28
Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298 (1972), and Jelco, Inc. v. Third
Judicial Dist. Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973), the
court was analyzing the interests of a contract seller vis-a-vis
a contract buyer, and not vis-a-vis a third-party.

This court

has not yet held, as respondents ujge that it now do, that the
doctrine of equitable coiwarsion is a rule of universal
application to be applied in all cases, regardless of the facts
or equities involved.

Because this case involves a third-parties

— t h e judgment creditors of the contract seller—it is
appropriate for this court to take a fresh look at the issue of
whether the doctrine of equitable conversion need be applied at
all in the context of the Utah judgment lien statute, and if so
whether equitable conversion is a rule of law or an equitable
principle to be applied only when application is equitable.
Respondents also argue it would be inconsistent to now hold
that a seller's interest is also real property, having previously

A

held in Butler v. Wilkinson/ 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), and Bill
Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co./ 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah
1984)/ that the buyer's interest is real property.
state:

Respondent's

"Logically/ both the buyer and the seller cannot own the

property and if this court has already determined that the buyer
does/ the seller cannot . . .."

(Respondents' Brief, p. 16).

The logic of respondents' position and the illogic of
petitioners' position is not explained.

One can think of

numerous circumstances involving two persons/ each of whom has an
interest in property; e.g. a lessor and lessee/ or a fee owner or
holder of a life estate and the holder of a reversionary
interest.

There is nothing illogical about finding that where

real property has been sold on contract there are two distinct
ownership interests to which a judgment lien might attach/ the
equitable interest of the contract purchaser/ as measured by his
equity in the proparty/ and the legal interest of the contract
seller/ as measured by the amount still owed to the seller on the
property at either the time the judgment against the seller is
properly docketec DC at the time the buyer gains actual notice of
the docketed judgaiant.

The courts of several jurisdictions have

recognized that both the contract seller and contract purchaser
have an ownership interest in the real property being purchased/
either one of which interests might become subject to a judgment
lien.

Compare/ e.g./ Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler ; 567 P.2d 631

(Wash. 1977), with Heath v. Dodson, 110 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1941);
Fulton v. Duro/ 700 P.2d 13 (Idaho 1985), with First Security
Bank v. Rogers/ 429 P.2d 386 (Idaho 1967); and Fridley v. Munson,

194 N.W. 1840 (S.D. 1923)/ with Yarnall v. First Nat. Bank of
Stillwater/ 74 B.R. 3 (D.S.D. 1986) [applying South Dakota law].
Respondents have stated no reason why ownership of real
property under Utah's judgment lien statute/ Utah Code Ann. § 7822-1/ cannot include the contract seller's legal interest as well
as the contract purchaser's equitable interest.

If this court

were to so hold/ it could entirely avoid application of the
equitable doctrine doctrine to a straight forward/ broadly worded
statute.
B.
IF THE CONTRACT SELLER'S INTEREST IS MEASURED BY THE
AMOUNT UNPAID AT THE TIME THE BUYER GAINS ACTUAL
NOTICE OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE SELLER, THE
BURDEN ON THE BUYER WILL BE MINIMAL
In Point III.B. of Respondents' Brief/ they argue that at
least a judgment lien should not attach to the contract seller's
retained legal interest on the property sold on contract until
the buyer has actual notice of the docketed judgment.
The Clements do not insist on a rule that would require a
buyer to search the judgment index before every installment
payment on a contract to purchase real property is made/ lest the
buyer end up paying twice.

A contract buyer should be entitled

to the benefit of all payments made to the seller.

In this case/

the Clements have asked nothing more than that the lien of their
judgment against the Barkers attach to the extent the contract
between the Barkers and their purchaser was unpaid at the time a
6

title search conducted on the Cannefaxes behalf

revealed the

existence of the judgment.
The Clements1 judgment was docketed in Salt Lake County on
August 19, 1985.

On September 25, 1985 funds to pay off the

contract between the judgment debtors and their purchaser, Hodge,
were escrowed.

On September 26/ 1985, prior to recording of

deeds (and presumably prior to disbursement of the escrowed
funds), a title search disclosed the existence of the judgment.
As of September 26, 1985, after paying off the encumbrances on
the Lockhart Road property, there was $54,464.94 payable to the
Barkers.

That is the amount of the Barkers1 interest in the

Lockhart Road property to which the lien of the Clements1
judgment attached.

The Clements have never even inquired as to

whether Diane Hodge made any other payments oat^een August 19 and
September 26, 1985.
If the amount of a judgment lien against a contract seller's
interest is measured by the amount due to the seller as of the
date the buyer gains actual notice of the docketed judgment, then
the inconvenience to the buyer of either (1) making payments from
that time forward to the seller's judgment creditor or (2) out of
an abundance of caution, interpleading payments as they came due,
would be minimal.
This case, of course, involves only a final lump sum payment
made to the Barkers at a time when a title search had disclosed

1.

See part C. of this Argument.
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the existence of the Clements1 judgment.

There is no evidence in

this case that either Diane Hodge or the Cannefaxes would have
incurred any burden had they insisted that the funds already
escrowed either be paid toward the judgment or that the
encumbrance created by the judgment otherwise be cleared before
the funds could be disbursed to the Barkers.
C.
THE CANNEFAXES HAVE NEVER BEFORE—NEITHER IN THE TRIAL
COURT NOR AT THE COURT OF APPEALS—ARGUED THAT THE
TITLE COMPANY HANDLING THE TWO-WAY CLOSING WAS
NOT THEIR AGENT FOR PURPOSES OF GAINING ACTUAL
NOTICE OF THE CLEMENTS1 JUDGMENT
The Cannefaxes1 sole position in both the trial court and at
the Court of Appeal tfas that equitable conversion applied to
convert the judgment debtors1 interast in the Lockhart Road
property to personalty/ so the judgment debtors had no real
property upon which a judgment lien could attach.

The general

rule is well established that an issue not raised in the trial
court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040
(Utah 1983); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Utah
1982); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359
(Utah App. 1990).
In Point IV of their brief, the Cannefaxes1 argue for the
first time that the actual notice of the Clements1 judgment
obtained when Surety Title Agency conducted a title search
between closing on September 25, 1985 and recording on September
26, 1985 was not actual notice to them, because there is no
evidence that Surety was their agent.
8

The Clements respectfully

submit that there is no reason to depart from the general rule in
this case and that the "agency" argument should not be
considered.
However, even if the court were to consider this new
argument, the Stipulated Facts upon which this case was decided
in the trial court are sufficient to support the finding that
Surety Title Agency was the Cannefaxes1 agent.
No. 14 (R. 108) states:

Stipulated Fact

A title search conducted by the settle-

ment agent, Surety Title Agency, between closing on September 25,
1985 and recording on September 26, 1985 disclosed [Clements1]
judgment against the Barkers."

Since it is clear from Stipulated

Fact No. 14 that Surety Title Agency was someone's agent, the
question is narrowed to a d^tariainaLiod as to who was the
principal.

The Clements submit that unless Surety Title was the

agent for the buyers at the two-way closing, there was no reason
to conduct a title search between closing and recording.

It was

ultimately the Cannefaxes who were interested in obtaining a
clear title, free from encumbrances.

This case was decided on

the Clements summary judgment motion; not on cross-motions for
summary judgment.

The Cannefaxes never asserted that a triable

issue existed as to whether they had actual notice of the
Clements1 judgment or that Surety Title Agency was not their
agent, nor did they assert that it would be a defense to the
attachment of a judgment lien if they did not have actual notice
of the judgment.
Finally, if this court were to conclude that the issue of
whether the Cannefaxes had actual notice of the Clements1
9

judgment either personally or through an agent is determinative
but unresolved/ the proper resolution of the appeal would not be
to affirm the order of the Court of Appeals/ but instead would be
to remand the case to the trial court.

Since this case was

resolved in the trial court on the Clements' summary judgment
motion/ if the existence of an agency relationship between the
Cannefaxes and Surety Title is not implicit in the Stipulated
Facts and in Cannefaxes1 failure to raise the issue in the trial
court/ then the case must be remanded to the trial court so that
it may make a factual determination as to for whom Surety Title
was acting as settlement agent.
Certainly the Clements had the burden in the trial court of
negating the existence of triable issues of material fact before
becoming entitled to summary judgment/ but as stated by Judge
Bullock in his dissenting opinion below; "[s]ince the Cannefaxes
had the burden of avoiding the lien in order to quiet title/
judgment against them is correct/ even though there was no
apparant inquiry into either actual notice/ the Cannefaxes1
knowledge jaf the judgment or lack of it/ or into their bona fides
in any respect.

[11] The Cannefaxes/ in seeking to quiet title

against the Clements/ had the burden of going forward with
evidence showing that the lien was unenforceable."

Cannefax v.

Clement/ 786 P.2d 1377, 1390-91 (Utah App. 1990) (J. Bullock
dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
CONCLUSION
Based on the stipulated facts, the arguments set forth in
Petitioners1 Brief/ and the arguments raised in the dissenting

opinion of Judge Bullock in the Court of Appeals/ petitioners
Donald and Ruth Clement respectfully submit that the decision of
the Utah Court of Appeals should be overruled and the summary
judgment entered in their favor by the trial court should be
reinstated.
Alternatively/ if this court finds that the issue of actual
notice by the Cannefaxes of the Clements1 judgment is crucial and
unresolved by the stipulated facts/ then the case should be
remanded to the Third District Court for a factual determination
as to whether Surety Title Agency was acting as agent for the
Cannefaxes or whetnjc the/ had personal knowledge of the judgment
prior to disbursement of Diane Hodge's final payment on the
contract.
Dated this ^ S _ day of September, 1990.
By
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> ^ > / 7 ^
Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney for Petitioners
Donald W. Clement and Ruth
Clement
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